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There is no necessary link between drug consumption, addiction and social
disintegration. Empirical evidence suggests that a considerable share of the
population has consumed illegal drugs during some period of their lives. A
substantial proportion of drug users have a job and home. Many mature out
of drug consumption in their thirties. Most drug users are normal consumers
responding systematically to relative prices.
After the failure of a repressive drugs policy, Switzerland allows cities to
pursue a third way between repression and liberalization. The state allows
carefully screened heavy addicts to inject heroin at a nominal price, while at
the same time raising the cost to potential entrants. The experiment has
produced encouraging results. The health of heroin users has improved and
crime has been reduced. A homogenized drugs policy in the European Union
would probably disallow such promising programmes.
 Bruno S. Frey
Dru
gs 
II
Let
 the
 ma
rke
t w
ork
SUMMARY
Economic Policy October 1997 Printed in Great Britain
' CEPR, CES, MSH, 1997.
1. THE ISSUES
Illegal drugs constitute a major social problem all over the world. They have
sparked off an enormous amount of literature in several scientic elds. This also
holds true for the economics of drugs. 1 Nevertheless, there are strongly divergent
views about which policy is desirable, and these are reected in the widely different
approaches taken in various countries. There seems to be a consensus only in one
respect: drug consumption is considered to be bad, especially for juveniles. This
tends to lead to a gut reaction of the sort: I do not want my children to become
drug addicts, and therefore drug consumption has to be suppressed by all means
available.
A major objective of this paper is to demonstrate that such a gut reaction is
mistaken. Drug consumption can never be eradicated by repression, for good
economic reasons. As long as there is a demand for drugs, an increase in expected
punishment raises the incentives to act against the prohibition, thereby making
deterrence less effective. This can be and has been done in a number of ways. Quite
legally, it pays drug dealers and consumers to hire ever better lawyers to evade
punishment. The same can be attempted by bribing police and legal agents.
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Moreover, the law is designed to match the severity of the punishment with the
seriousness of the crime committed. In Europe at least, judges are unwilling to
impose very high sanctions for minor drug offences because they are not allowed to
jack up the punishment to compensate for the often low probability of an offender
being captured. For all these reasons, the effective expected punishment by drug
dealers and consumers is upwardly bounded. It is therefore not possible to establish
a sufciently high deterrent to reduce or abolish such activities, as all efforts at
prohibition (including alcohol and prostitution) document (see Thornton, 1991).
Even if deterrence worked (which it does not), it would not be optimal to have an
extremely high deterrent; just as it would not be socially optimal to reduce
environmental pollution to zero. A sound drugs policy therefore seeks to minimize
the harmful effects of drugs.
This paper deals with two widely misunderstood aspects of drug consumption.
Section 2 investigates the question Who consumes drugs?, while section 3 deals
with the nature of the addiction. The experience with drugs policy in the city of
Zurich is discussed in section 4, which leads to a summary of pertinent consequences
for drugs policy in Europe in section 5.
2. WHO CONSUMES DRUGS?
According to a prevalent view, drug users are addicts who do not earn any income
from regular work (but rather nance their vice by illegal drug dealings, robberies
and property crimes, and prostitution) and are socially disintegrated (they live on
the streets and do not have a home). The vast majority of normal people have to be
protected against such addiction. However, existing evidence provides a starkly
different picture of reality. Two stylized facts are crucial: (1) many consume drugs;
and (2) many drug users function normally.
2.1. Many consume drugs
A substantial proportion of the population have used illegal drugs during some
period of their lives. In the USA, around 30% of the population (older than 12
years) have consumed marijuana at least once, and more than 10% have tried
cocaine; among college students more than 50% have taken illegal drugs (US
Department of Justice, 1994). For Germany, the respective gure for lifetime
consumption is 16% (Hartwig and Pies, 1995); for Switzerland, 17% (Rehm,
1995). These gures are lower-bound estimates as the illegality of drugs tends to
drive consumption underground. Thus, drugs are consumed by many otherwise
perfectly normal persons despite the repressive policy. Care should therefore be
taken not to designate such a large proportion of the population as criminal
because the attribute would then become meaningless and lose its deterring
function.
390 BRUNO S. FREY
2.2. Many drug users function normally
Most drug consumers are not addicts; nor do they lead a miserable life. Rather,
many regular drug users are productive, functioning members of society (Miron
and Zwiebel, 1995; Zinberg, 1979). A study for Switzerland (K×unzler, 1990) reveals
that 68% of drug consumers in Zurich are socially totally integrated, in the sense of
having regular work and regular housing conditions (according to the high Swiss
standards); another 26% are partially integrated, having either regular work or
regular housing. A later study (M×uller and Grob, 1992) again for Zurich, using
somewhat different denitions of work and housing, found 49% to be totally
integrated and another 30% to be at least partially integrated. A large majority
(65%) accordingly nance their drug consumption by (legally) working, 20% by
using the money given by social institutions, and 29% by irregular (8% by
prostitution) or illegal activities such as drug dealing and property crimes (multiple
answers were admitted).
Existing research also suggests that drugs are less harmful than commonly
portrayed (see Miron and Zwiebel (1995) and Hartwig and Pies (1995) for
references). Thus, heroin can be consumed over extended periods without
damaging health, and there is little evidence that it lowers work productivity. The
strongly negative consequences on health and productivity are due to the repression
associated with illegality: in particular, the induced uncertainty about the quality of
the drugs bought, which is responsible for most accidental deaths.
All this, of course, does not mean that drugs are harmless, and that there is not a
sizeable group of persons who ruin their lives by drug consumption, especially under
drug prohibition. But it indicates that the consumption of drugs is rather widespread
in our society (and elsewhere), and that there is no iron law leading to hopeless
addiction.
3. ADDICTION OR CESSATION?
While drug consumption is widespread, most persons just try it between one and ve
times, and are thereafter abstinent. In Germany, among the 16% who had
consumed drugs once in their lifetime, only 5% had taken them within the last year.
In Switzerland, among the 17% of people who had consumed drugs at some time
during their life, only 2% are current consumers. Obviously, a large number of users
have not become addicted. This nding is generally disbelieved by the public
because it is inconsistent with the awful picture of the visible drugs scene, as well as
the popular view of drug consumption taking a progressive, irreversible course.
A substantial proportion of drug users experience what has been called a natural
recovery (see, for example, the surveys in Fahrenkrug et al. (1995); Waldorf and
Biernacki (1979); Stall and Biernacki (1986)). A comparison of seven longitudinal
studies (Abegg, 1992) suggests the presence of natural recovery for different groups
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of drug consumers. Nobody claims that all drug users stop consuming drugs, but a
substantial number do so on their own. The proportion has a similar magnitude to
those who quit with the help of professional and extensive medical treatment. The
phenomenon was rst observed for Vietnam veterans: many of them took heroin
while in east Asia, but an overwhelming majority stopped doing so upon their return
to the USA (Winick, 1962; Robins, 1993). The existence of quantitatively signicant
natural recovery has also been shown for Germany and Switzerland (e.g., Weber
and Schneider, 1992; Klingemann, 1995).
The major determinant of untreated cessation of drug consumption is simply
age. This maturing out of drug consumption is quite compatible with a normal
economic relative price effect. The opportunity cost of drug consumption rises with
age because the alternatives relating to gainful (legal) employment and a
satisfactory family life become more attractive. Moreover, the cost of staying in the
drugs scene increases when people can no longer depend on the material and
psychological support of their parents, but have to take over the responsibility for
their own life.
Empirical evidence is consistent with this interpretation. Most studies nd that
many people stop taking drugs in their thirties. An analysis of ve studies (Abegg,
1992) revealed that one did not nd any evidence while four clearly did: after three
years or more, between 23% and 65% of the drug-taking population totally
abstained and were fully socially integrated. Abeggs (1992) own study shows that
drug consumption drastically falls for people more than 30 years of age. The earlier
the start of the drug career, the less likely and the later is the maturing out. The
empirical research also supports the importance of alternatives in the form of
satisfactory work opportunities and partnerships, but not of the deterrence of
repressive policy (SFA, 1989).
The discussion in sections 2 and 3 suggests that the economic model of human
behaviour also works for drugs (which is, of course, the basis of the analysis by
Becker and Murphy (1988)): a substantial proportion of drug users are normal
consumers, and only a small minority are addicted in the sense that they do not
have any choice. In particular, available evidence is inconsistent with the view of a
systematic underestimation of the cost that drug users face in the future (see Miron
and Zwiebel (1995) for references). 2 Rather, drug consumers react systematically to
changes in benets and costs.
4. THE ZURICH DRUGS POLICY EXPERIMENT
As would be expected in a socially and politically rather conservative country (which
still maintains features elsewhere prevalent in the 19th century), the drugs policy in
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2 According to Viscusi (1994), in the case of smoking people even overestimate the health risks.
Switzerland was for a long time based on repression.3 It was thought possible to
suppress drug consumption by police actions and sentencing drug dealers and users,
even in the case of soft drugs such as marijuana. This belief proved to be mistaken,
especially in the case of the countrys largest city, Zurich. As theoretically expected,
the repressive policy proved to be ineffective. In 1987, despite continuous
interventions, the police could not even prevent the emergence of an open drugs
scene just behind the main railway station, the infamous Needle Park. It quickly
turned into a most ugly scene. The park was lthy and full of rubbish, and was
populated by heavy drug users, some of whom were in very bad health. At the same
time, the drugs supply was taken over by strictly organized gangs, who sold drugs at
specially low prices to adolescents and even schoolchildren. The drugs market was
not stable as the huge opportunities for prot attracted more and more new gangs
from other countries (mostly the Lebanon, Albania and parts of Africa). This
predictably (see, e.g., Gambetta, 1993) led to gang wars, and several people were
stabbed, shot and killed. Property crimes committed by drug consumers rose
exponentially. When the external cost grew intolerable to the inhabitants and
tourists, the city government decided to close the park by brute police force. But the
drugs scene immediately sprang up in another place, an abandoned railway station
called Letten, where the same intolerable situation arose.
The citys political leadership nally saw the futility of a purely repressive policy,
and in 1994 decided to try a third way between repression and liberalization. This
programme, which continues today (April 1997), is based on three pillars. The rst,
and by far the most important, is for the city government to provide drugs, mostly
heroin, under controlled conditions to carefully screened heavily addicted drug
users. Only a nominal price of 10 Swiss francs per day is asked, whereas the cost per
gram of heroin to the city government is 13 Swiss francs, and average consumption
per participant per day is 0.5 grams. Participants have to consume (inject) the heroin
in special ofces, and thus the drugs cannot be traded. Only persons having lived in
Zurich for an extended period and with a long drug-taking career and several futile
attempts at medical and psychological treatment were accepted for the programme.4
A second pillar of the policy is that the participants must attend regular discussion
and counselling sessions, and undergo medical observation. The third pillar is police
action aiming to raise entry cost to non-drug users. An effort is made to prevent drug
consumption in public, but the police are well aware that it is impossible to suppress
drug consumption within buildings and at home. The police take a rather liberal
position with respect to designer drugs because it is virtually impossible to control
them effectively in discos and at parties.
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So far only a preliminary scientic evaluation is available (Uchtenhagen et al.,
1996). Yet it is already quite clear that the policy of the third way is quite
successful. The health of the heavy drug users in the programme has improved
dramatically and no deaths due to drug taking have occurred. Participants also
produce much less external cost. No less than half of them now have a regular job,
and four-fths no longer commit property crimes. More than two-thirds now live in
an apartment and can be considered to be socially integrated. These improvements
can be attributed to the programme. Thus, for example, at the beginning only 16%
of the participants held a regular job, but this increased to 50% after twelve months
in the programme. Conversely, at the beginning 50% were unemployed, but this fell
to 14% after one year. Similarly, at the outset of the programme, 12% committed
heavy and petty theft, and 54% were engaged in drug crimes, but these gures fell
to 2% and 20%, respectively. The criminal and social situation in the city of Zurich
has thus improved markedly, mainly due to drawing these heavy drug users away
from the illegal drugs market. This success has been appreciated by the voters, many
of whom were initially sceptical or even outrightly hostile to the state handing out
heroin. In a popular referendum which took place in December 1996, the citizens
of the city of Zurich approved the new drugs policy with a majority of 63%, which is
a high rate of support even compared to other referenda.
While it is too early to draw rm and nal policy conclusions, it can certainly be
said that the third way undertaken in Zurich looks promising. The same holds for
similar experiments in other Swiss cities. The experiment may well serve as a model
for other political units.
5. A HOMOGENIZED EUROPEAN DRUGS POLICY?
Most countries of the European Union pursue a strongly repressive drugs policy
(see, e.g., Hartwig and Pies, 1995; Linder, 1995); only the Netherlands and Spain
are more liberal. Due to the attraction of drug users to where drugs are more easily
available, it seems at rst sight necessary to harmonize drugs policy in a Europe
without frontiers. However, the example of the city of Zurich shows that it is
possible, at least to some extent, to pursue an independent drugs policy even in a
small area.
Due to the overwhelming number of drug-repressive EU member countries, a
homogenization of drugs policy will probably result in a repressive approach on the
European level. To the extent that such a European drugs policy already exists, it
does indeed follow this course (see Mahnke, 1995). For the reasons discussed, a
repressive policy entails huge material and human costs, and will almost certainly
prove to be ineffective (similarly to the policy pursued in the USA: see Miron and
Zwiebel (1995)). Consequently, programmes like that of Zurich, although they show
great promise, would be impossible to introduce. Drugs policy is a clear instance in
which variety instead of equalization tends to lead to superior results.
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General discussion
Charles Wyplosz felt that the economic argument for restricting drug use must
derive from some associated negative externality. Clearly, crime committed by drug
addicts and drug dealers was an important externality, but then, as for any criminal
activity, the solution is to punish the crime itself rather than the underlying
motivations for crime. Georges de MÑenil noted that apart from the criminality
involved, drug addiction imposes a massive externality on publicly funded health
systems, and also contributes to other social ills such as potential violence and
increased trafc accidents. Vidar Christiansen added that the families of drug
addicts, and the neighbourhoods they live in, also bear the brunt.
For Hans-Werner Sinn the search for externalities smacked too much of a liberal
approach, which implicitly assumes that individuals are completely rational. He
argued that there was a contradiction between the claimed liberalism and the
paternalism implicit in the policy recommendations. For instance, the suggestion
that making drugs available cheaply to addicts will destroy the illegal drugs market,
and that this, in turn, will reduce overall drug use, assumes myopic behaviour at the
individual level. If, on the contrary, individuals are rational and sufciently forward
looking, the prospect of cheap drugs in the future may even persuade many more to
try drugs. In other words, cheap drugs as a policy works only if people are myopic
and irrational, but in that case the liberal approach is suspect to begin with. If
preferences are ckle, a paternalistic approach is superior as it starts from the
presumption that individual preferences should not be trusted.
Daniel Cohen felt that the possibility of dynamically inconsistent behaviour
justied intervention: it is often the case that a drug addict wants to quit and yet is
unable to do so. The price elasticity of demand for drugs was relevant here. For
instance, if the quantity demanded is relatively xed, one could conne attention to
eliminating the externalities. Klaus F. Zimmermann agreed that intertemporal
inconsistency of individual preferences called for regulation, and suggested that the
standard theories of preference formation might prove useful in designing the best
form of regulation.
The policy alternatives to combat drug use were also discussed. Charles Wyplosz
thought that one solution was to combine liberalization with high taxation to deter
the use of drugs. This would be similar to the UK policy to restrict the use of
tobacco. Georges de MÑenil believed that there was not a simple continuum between
liberal and repressive drugs control policies. As shown by the Dutch experience, the
specics of the drugs control policy had a signicant impact on the outcome. Juan
Dolado questioned the possibility of segregating addicts and newcomers in the drugs
market. Michele Polo felt that in the real world the distinction between liberal and
paternalistic policies is not very sharp. With drugs the important issues were
marginal deterrence and preventing addicts switching from soft to hard drugs. The
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best way to do this was to have a system of graduated penalties, and perhaps even a
slight liberalization of soft drugs. David Begg noted that while everyone agreed that
the current system was not working very well, when it came to policy alternatives,
perfect paternalism had been stacked against imperfect liberalism. The paper
needed to take a harder look at what precisely is wrong with the current system
before proposing any policy responses.
Giorgio Basevi wondered if there should there be a Europe-wide policy on drugs.
He enquired if the survey data had taken account of the fact that many drug addicts
are introduced to drugs in prison. Patrick Rey, reacting to Bruno Freys remarks,
pointed out that addicts, by denition, must be those who cannot shake off the drug
habit.
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